

Secret

- 2 -

I. PROPOSED PROJECTS FOR THE APPLICATION OF QUANTITATIVE AND GRAPHIC TECHNIQUES TO THE FACTUAL ANALYSIS OF SOVIET BROADCAST MATERIAL

a. Basic Content Analysis: Within the past few years, considerable pioneer work has been done by social scientists in the application of quantitative techniques to the analysis of the verbal content of mass communications material. Applied to continuing propaganda, such as that emanating from the Soviet radio, the content trend can thereby be presented in terms of shifts in percentages of content devoted to relevant objectives, themes, slogans, symbols, subjects, and events. Such a method has obvious advantages in the direction of precision, objectivity, and presentation. Of equal or greater importance, however, is the possibility of discovering the beginning of propaganda shifts before they otherwise become apparent on the basis of purely impressionistic methods of analysis. And considering that Soviet propaganda, by virtue of its function as a tool of Soviet policy, can be expected to reflect and at least in some cases to adumbrate both major and minor changes or developments in this policy, the significance of such a method relative to assessing future Soviet intentions is considerable.

To take a specific case. Recently (immediately subsequent to the Italian elections and prior to the Smith-Molotov exchange) and currently, for example, ORE was and is concerned with the possibility of a Soviet "peace offensive" or some move(s) aimed at a measure of ostensible east-west accommodation more or less on the basis of existent power lines. Consequently, there was and is considerable interest in the trend of Soviet propaganda as a possible indicator of such move(s). But without a quantitative analysis of the Soviet propaganda trend, no precise, objective, and firmly established description of that trend has been possible. It has been noted, on the basis of impressionistic observation, that in general terms Soviet radio charges of American "warmongering" and the like (which would presumably decrease in the event of an ostensibly accommodating Soviet policy) may have receded somewhat in volume over the past weeks; and that Soviet championing of "peace," etc. (which would presumably rise in volume in the event of ostensible accommodation) may have increased. But without systematic quantitative measurement, it is impossible to say exactly when such a trend began (if it actually exists), how precipitously, how much, how extensively, in what specific or general contexts, to what audiences, etc.—all of which information, in precise quantitative form, is vitally important both for an adequate description of the trend itself and for assessing its meaning. (The same may be said with reference to all other themes and subjects both contained in and omitted from Soviet propaganda.) Had such information been available, for example, it might have been possible to anticipate to a certain extent the nature of the Soviet response to Ambassador Smith's 4 May oral statement to Molotov.

It is recommended that Special Reports Division be authorized (and expanded sufficiently in personnel) to undertake on a continuing basis a quantitative, factual study of the content of Soviet broadcast propaganda. It should be pointed out, however, that the complex and sensitive nature of such a study militates against plunging in with both feet and the production of immediate results. For one thing, its success and effectiveness will depend to a large extent on the

Secret

secret

- 3 -

adequacy of the preliminary planning and experimentation involved. It will be necessary, among other things, to construct a code of significant and relevant themes, symbols, slogans, geographical areas, subjects, etc. that can be applied to the content of Soviet broadcasts, and, conversely, to which the broadcasts apply. And such a code will have to be devised on the basis both of theoretical, *a priori* considerations as well as on the basis of empirical, trial-and-error application to the broadcasts themselves.

The basic code should be detailed enough to include all of the possible pertinent categories needed for an adequate description of the Soviet propaganda pattern and trends and for the revelation of possible cues about future Soviet policy—without at the same time becoming too cumbersome and complex to apply efficiently. It should for example include the following general types of categories:

- (1) The relevant actors— blocs, countries, classes, groups, Parties, individuals.
- (2) The ascribed condition(s), situation(s), or relationship(s) within, among, or between the actors—e.g., domination, subordination, accommodation, competition, conflict, cooperation, morality, immorality, strength, weakness, etc.
- (3) Locus or loci of the condition, situation, or relationship ascribed—e.g., worldwide, within or with reference to particular area(s), within or with reference to particular country(s).
- (4) Degree of explicitness of the particular ascription(s).

If properly constructed, and if the possible applications are anticipated sufficiently, it will be possible to so combine the detailed category references as to yield quantitative data on the degree of Soviet radio attention to practically any general or specific theme, event, or area—data which can be presented in either tabular or graphic form and which will reveal significant trends.

Consider, for example, the possible development of an accommodating Soviet policy subsequent to the Communist defeat in the Italian elections—a development which Soviet propaganda would reflect and which it might presumably anticipate. Propaganda-wise, a number of Soviet propaganda elements would have to be taken account of in consideration of such a development. But of major importance among them would be included themes relative to: (1) U.S. warmongering, imperialism, etc. (that is, Soviet propaganda content charging the U.S. with serious war-provoking international immoralities); and (2) the subject of peace, international cooperation, etc. (that is, Soviet propaganda content giving positive and operational emphasis to peace).

With application to Soviet propaganda of the proposed quantitative methods, it would be possible to produce and present on a regular basis a trend chart such as the following.

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secret

- 5 -

This sort of graph would not, of course, tell the complete story by any means; for it would be necessary to qualify the apparent trend by reference to more detailed elements of the pertinent content and by the examination of correlative subsidiary themes. With these elements and subsidiary themes available, via a sufficiently detailed category system, correct evaluation of the trend would be provided. Applied to the above illustration, for example, it would be necessary to know what proportion of the Soviet radio's attention to peace represents little more than a complement (implied or explicit) to the attacks on U.S. warmongering, etc.

And the other details of the specific elements comprising the overall trends abstracted from the coded data can be presented in terms of percentages in the paragraphs of exposition accompanying the trend graph(s).


Another illustration of the value of quantitative propaganda analysis relative to cueing anticipated Soviet policy has to do with current speculations as to whether, more or less giving up momentarily in Europe, the Soviets have decided to turn their concentration of attention instead to other world areas—e.g., the Near and Middle East. If the Soviets have thus decided, or if they do decide, this decision could be expected to be reflected in increased propaganda attention to these areas—accompanied probably by a decrease in attention to Europe. And quantitative analysis would reveal such a propaganda trend, if it exists. For example.

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
Page 1

Proportion of Soviet Broadcast Content
Devoted to "U.S. Warmongering" and to "Peace"



(Note: This graph is based on purely hypothetical figures.)

Primary Areas of Soviet
Foreign Broadcast Attention
(by percentage of broadcast content)



(Note: This graph is based on purely hypothetical figures.)

secret

- 7 -

The above are just examples of innumerable trend charts that could be prepared and presented on the basis of quantitative content analysis of Soviet broadcasts. Line graphs, bar charts, and tabular presentation of percentages would be equally applicable. The resulting data would also lend themselves to numerous special studies and reports dealing with particular events, themes, areas, etc., requiring and worth special attention.

In addition to the single basic category list to be applied to Soviet radio propaganda, there is also need for supplementary code categories to be used in conjunction with the basic list. One of these supplements should consist of significant symbols whose appearance in Soviet propaganda may be immediately revealing as to its trend--and which, taken in conjunction with the data derived from application of the basic category list, may serve to confirm, qualify, or at any rate to make more meaningful the resulting generalizations. Among such significant symbols, for example, would be such as:

- Warmongers, instigators of war, etc.
- Imperialists, imperialism
- Capitalists, monopolists, etc.
- Democracy
- Freedom
- Security
- Independence, sovereignty
- Socialism
- Communism
- Fascism
- Communist Party
- Right-wing socialists
- Militarists, militarism
- atomic diplomacy, atomic energy, etc.
- Important personages in the Soviet hierarchy
- Etc.

Another of the supplementary code lists would have to do with specific international and national events and situations. The basic list, it should be noted, is applicable to any event that might occur; but it does not treat them as events as such. And to give the resulting generalizations more immediate operational meaning, it would be necessary also to consider them in terms of their relationship to specific events that are exploited, slighted, or omitted by Soviet propaganda. Included in a list of events for application to Soviet broadcasts would be such as the following:

- The Marshall Plan
- Western Union Formation
- Smith-Molotov exchange
- Wallace-Stalin exchange
- Palestine situation
- Specific U.N. activities
- Anniversaries--e.g., May Day, V-E Day, Roosevelt's death, etc.
- International conferences

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- 8 -

b. Beam Analysis: Such data as these derived from the application of code categories should be available not only with reference to the totality of Soviet radio propaganda, but, of equal or greater importance, with reference to specific Soviet radio beams. It would seem to be essential to know, for example, to what extent Soviet broadcasts to and about the Near and Middle East refer to events, situations, etc., in these areas--and the quantitative trend of this attention. In terms of such considerations as the direction that Soviet international activity will take (assuming a relaxation of Soviet activity in Europe), an increase in propaganda attention to such areas as the Near and Middle East, in Soviet broadcasts to the Near and Middle East, would be of as much significance (and probably more) as an increase in attention to these areas in the totality of Soviet broadcasts--or, at any rate, the discovery of corresponding increases would lend added significance to both.

In fact, one of the regular features of a continuous quantitative content analysis of Soviet radio propaganda material should be what might be called "beam analysis"--i.e., a study of the identities, similarities, and differences in the content of Soviet broadcasts beamed to respective national or area audiences, to say nothing of the intensive study of the impact of Soviet radio propaganda (in terms of content) on each of the most significant countries and areas to which Soviet broadcasts are beamed. As indicated above, such analysis would provide precise and near-immediate data on the beam differentials in Soviet broadcast trends--knowledge of which should prove a significant adjunct to other intelligence information in evaluating the possible intentions of Soviet policy.

It should be noted that the basic data for "beam analysis" stems directly from the data derived by the application of the basic and supplementary category codes as noted above. What it represents is a refinement of the derived data with emphasis placed on the differences and similarities in what the Soviet radio tells to different audiences.

c. Program-Type Analysis: Here, too (as in paragraphs d. and e. below), the proposal represents primarily a refinement of data derived from application of the basic and supplementary category codes as noted in paragraph a. above. In this case, the refinement would be directed toward revealing the differences and similarities in the content, structure, functions, and roles of the different types of programs that emanate from the Soviet radio--all of which is required for the most efficient and knowledgeable factual analysis of Soviet broadcast material. At present, there is no systematic information on the differential use to which the Soviet radio puts such differing types of programs as newscasts, commentaries, broadcasts of Soviet press editorials, TASS dispatches, and the like. And basic, systematic knowledge, as well as continuing knowledge, about this phase of Soviet broadcasting is requisite for correct assessment of Soviet radio propaganda. It is evident, for example, that the functions accorded to (as well as the techniques used in) Soviet newscasts differ somewhat from those accorded Soviet commentaries--out without systematic and precise knowledge of the differences, it is impossible to assess the significance of the two or to determine the amount or type of attention that should be accorded them in the factual analysis of Soviet propaganda.

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- 9 -

d. Commentator Analysis: On a somewhat different level, essentially the same problems apply to the numerous Soviet commentators that write the Soviet radio commentaries. Here, again, no systematic and precise knowledge is available as to their relative importance, their propaganda functions, their particular specialities, the distribution accorded them, etc. And with application of the above-recommended quantitative methods, such knowledge could readily be produced--which in turn would make the problem of factual analysis considerably more methodical and controlled, and in many instances should provide adequate short-cuts that otherwise would not be available.

e. Intensive Study of Soviet Regional Broadcasts: Among the overt sources of information about conditions within the USSR, Soviet regional broadcasts have as yet remained relatively untapped. It is proposed that such broadcasts be more consistently and extensively monitored and that their content be subjected to the same type of factual content analysis outlined above. This should be done with particular reference to the internal Soviet situation--to such elements as the status of civilian morale, Party activities, reconstruction efforts, economic difficulties, etc.

f. Source Analysis: Of particular interest with reference to counter-efforts vis-a-vis Soviet radio propaganda are the various non-Soviet sources of news and opinions used by Moscow in support of its contentions, charges, accusations, interpretations, etc. It is proposed, therefore, that regular, periodic quantitative studies of utilization of these sources be instituted--their frequency of use, the contexts within which they are used, the languages in which particular sources are used, etc. Once a content analysis program (such as outlined above) were launched, this could be done without a great deal of additional effort.

II. UNEXPLOITED OR SLIGHTED INTELLIGENCE SUBJECTS FOR SPECIAL REPORTS

Of the various types of special reports issued to date by the Special Reports Division, FBIS, two have received especially favorable reactions from FBIB/CIA clients and appear to have been put to specific and extensive use: (1) reports on such subjects as the Soviet Transportation System and Soviet Agriculture, as revealed in Soviet radio broadcasts; and (2) reports on world radio reactions to significant international events, such as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Smith-Molotov exchange, etc.

a. In view of this, it is recommended that more time and effort be concentrated on the production of such types of special reports as the above. Similar to the report on Soviet Transportation, for example, such subjects as the following should be surveyed on a regular, periodic basis:

- Soviet Industry
- Soviet communications
- Soviet natural resources
- Soviet science
- Soviet fuel and power

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- 10 -

b. And with reference to developing and occurring international events, more reports on foreign radio reactions, issued more immediately after the event, could be produced with an expansion of personnel.

It is further recommended that, in terms of available personnel, precedence be given by Special Reports to studies and reports relative to the above types of subjects rather than to OCD requests on which only peripheral information (and in many cases of doubtful value) can be provided from monitored foreign radio broadcasts.

III. ADDITION OF OTHER SECTIONS TO SPECIAL REPORTS DIVISION

a. Soviet-Influenced Broadcasts: To date, Special Reports Division has been in a position to concentrate only on USSR radio broadcasts. But, from the point of view of Soviet-controlled and Soviet-influenced propaganda as well as of intelligence following countries and stations are of equivalent importance:

- The USSR's European Satellites
- The Soviet zone of Germany
- Pyongyang (North Korea)
- North Shensi (Communist-controlled China)
- Soviet-controlled clandestine broadcasts

Concentration on and application of quantitative techniques to the content of broadcasts from each of these sources would make it possible to assess the significance of their role and functions in the totality of Soviet propaganda; and to reveal whatever significant differences and similarities existing between them and equivalent USSR broadcasts. Concentration of effort on them would also make it possible to produce special reports about the countries and areas from which they emanate similar to those listed for the USSR in section II above—such as intelligence reports on the status of the transportation system, of agriculture, industry, etc., within the European satellites of the USSR.

b. Non-Soviet Broadcasts: For assessing the reactions of certain critical world areas to both Soviet and non-Soviet propaganda (and other activities), it would be advisable to establish Special Reports Sections that would concentrate exclusively on broadcasts from such selected areas as the following:

- The Near and Middle East
- The Far East and Southeast Asia
- Non-Soviet clandestine transmitters

To these, the same quantitative methods as outlined above could be applied.

Chief, Special Reports

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